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ABSTRACT  This article examines how the Liberal and New Democratic Accord was framed
through and by national television news during the first week of December 2008. Using new
institutionalism theory, this article argues that politicians must negotiate with journalists to
present their framing of issues. While journalists may repeat and even balance competing
frames, they also interpret politics strategically, and this is what dominates coverage. Based
on a frame analysis, the study examines the national television coverage of the proposed coali-
tion government. The analysis finds that TV news presented the preferred frames of the gov-
ernment and the coalition in similar proportion. However, the coverage spent significantly
more time assessing performance and strategy and was highly critical of the strategy and
performance of the key political players.
KEYWORDS Frame analysis; Coalition government; Television news; Canadian Politics
RÉSUMÉ  Cette étude examine la façon par laquelle les informations nationales télévisées
ont exposé les cadres d’analyse du gouvernement et des partenaires de la coalition durant
la crise politique de 2008. La démarche entreprise utilise une méthodologie d’analyse-cadre,
où la proportion de la couverture médiatisée accordée au gouvernement est comparée à celle
donnée à la coalition. De plus, cette étude compare les cadres préférés des élites politiques
avec les discussions télévisées de stratégies. Nous trouvons que malgré que l’analyse-cadre
du gouvernement a reçu, marginalement, plus d’attention que celle de la coalition,
l’emphase principale de la télévision nationale était sur l’évaluation des aspects stratégiques
de la crise. L’évaluation par tous les acteurs politiques était fort négative.
MOTS CLÉS  Analyse des trames; Gouvernment de coalition; nouvelles à la télévision, la
politique Canadienne
Introduction
On December 1, 2008, federal Liberal leader Stéphane Dion and federal New De-mocrat leader Jack Layton signed “An Accord on a Cooperative Government to
Address the Present Economic Crisis” (Dion & Layton, 2008). This accord was designed
to provide an alternative government when the scheduled December 5 vote of no con-
fidence was to be held to defeat the newly elected minority Conservative government.
Had the vote been held, the accord would have marked the first federal coalition gov-
ernment in Canada since the Union government from 1917 to 1920. Not only was the
Canadian Journal of Communication Vol 36 (2011) 559-578
©2011 Canadian Journal of Communication Corporation
Lydia Miljan is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Windsor,
1155 Chrysler Hall North, 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, ON N9B 3P4. Email: lmiljan@uwindsor.ca .
560 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 36 (4)
accord a unique proposition in Canadian federal politics, but also the government’s
response to prorogue Parliament to avoid a confidence vote was unprecedented in
Canadian parliamentary history.
The signing of the accord was salient for the Canadian public, with news reports
depicting Canadians talking about the event in the streets, online, and on radio talk
shows. Mass media outlets labelled the event a “political crisis,” with television, news-
papers, radio, and the Internet all running sensational headlines regarding the pro-
posed coalition government.1 The public was energized, with some organizing rallies
to support the coalition; others organized to rally in favour of the government. Each
side presented arguments to the public to frame the issue to their advantage. In the
simplest terms, the accord partners framed the issue as the government not adequately
dealing with an economic crisis; the government framed the problem as the opposition
parties attempting to grab power. This article examines the way in which English tele-
vision news covered the competing frames of the coalition and the government, as
well as how television news judged the strategy and performance of the parties and
political leadership.
Because this event unfolded during one week in December and was given consid-
erable attention by all media, it was an event that fit well into the media’s normative
interpretation of balance as providing two sides to a story. News organizations, such
as the CBC, claim that they “contribute to informed debate on issues that matter to
Canadians by reflecting a diversity of opinion.” Indeed, CBC goes so far as to assert,
“Our content on all platforms presents a wide range of subject matter and views” (CBC,
2011). In practice, however, the range tends to be narrow. Although it is rare for issues
to have just two sides, this event, unfolding over a short period of time, with the coali-
tion partners on one side and the government on the other, made it simple for the
media to focus on these two perspectives. The question asked here is whether either
of the two sides was able to become the primary definer of the event.
New institutionalism and frames
New institutional theory regards the mass media as an important political institution
worthy of attention and study. Timothy Cook (2006) asserts that news making and
policymaking are increasingly intertwined to the point of being indistinguishable. The
reason journalists are powerful political actors is their unrivalled ability to channel or
structure national politics (Sparrow, 1999). It is, therefore, vitally important for political
actors to have journalists accept their interpretation—or framing—of issues, for ac-
ceptance of a particular position can have far-reaching implications for the success of
a political party or policy.
News making involves negotiation among journalists and groups who seek news
access (Lawrence, 2006). Part of this negotiation entails that political players frame
their message in ways that best capture media attention and acceptance (Aday, 2006;
Chong & Druckman, 2007; Entman, 2007). Political players use frames to encourage
audiences to think about issues in a particular way (e.g., Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004;
Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997). Framing contests are espe-
cially important during a political crisis (Boin, Hart, & McConnell, 2009). One reason
for their heightened importance is that during a crisis, the media are more attuned to
the two sides of the conflict, almost to the exclusion of all other voices. Indeed, during
a perceived crisis, political elites act as primary definers (Welch, Fenwick and Roberts,
1997). As Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts (1978) note:
The important point about the structured relationship between the media
and the primary institutional definers is that it permits the institutional de-
finers to establish the initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic
in question. This interpretation then “commands the field” in all subsequent
treatment and sets the terms of reference within which all further coverage
or debated takes place. Arguments against a primary interpretation are forced
to insert themselves into itsdefinition of “what is at issue”—they must begin
from this framework of interpretation as their starting point. (p. 58, italics
original)
In a two-sided contest, such as the proposed coalition government, the simplest
way to determine which frame dominated is by examining whether news coverage
balanced the competing frames. This is done by measuring content bias (Entman,
2004). Frames are considered powerful if they are accepted and repeated by the media.
American research has shown that in certain cases, governments have been successful
in promoting their frame at the expense of their opponents and this has resulted in
policy adoption. For example, a number of scholars have demonstrated how the
George W. Bush presidency was effective in promoting its preferred frame of weapons
of mass destruction to justify the invasion of Iraq (Bennett & Lawrence, 2007; Edy &
Meirick, 2007; Johansen & Joslyn, 2008). Such one-sided framing contests do not hap-
pen with great frequency, and when they occur, they do not last for long periods. For
the most part scholars have failed to find significant content bias of in a policy issue
that favours one frame over its competition. This is especially true in studies that meas-
ure content bias in elections (Frizzell & Westell, 1985; Johnston, Blais, Brady, & Crête,
1992; Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil, & Nadeau, 2000; Soroka & Andrew, 2010). 
The critical communications literature, however, provides evidence of one-sided
analysis when it comes to “moral panics” (e.g., Cohen, 1980; Hall et al., 1978). In these
cases, something or someone is identified as a threat to society. As Cohen (1980) states,
“A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereo-
typical fashion by the mass media” (p. 9). Cohen and others refer to these instances
as “moral panic,” and those who are the subject of the moral panic are portrayed as
“folk devils,” the “visible reminders of what we should not be” (p. 10). The crisis liter-
ature is dominated by the term “moral panic,” which is typically associated with crime
and deviance. (For a review of the literature, see Hunt, 1997; for specific cases, see Ed-
wards & Soetenhorst-de Savornin, 1994; Homan, 2003; Klug, 2005.) The primary de-
finers for these cases are state officials in the form of law enforcement and/or
politicians. The term has been applied to many issues, including “AIDS, child abuse,
crowd violence at football matches, drug addiction, juvenile crime and surrogate moth-
ers” (Hunt, 1997, p. 638). As compelling as this literature appears, it is somewhat re-
moved from the present discussion as the potential viewpoints had two groups of
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elites vying for the role of primary interpreter: the government and the coalition part-
ners. It is somewhat of a stretch to apply the “folk devil” label to elites; however, Kate
Jones (2008) did attempt such a stretch with some success in her study of Australian
career politicians.
Keeping in mind the critical literature on sources and crisis, we now nonetheless
turn to new institutional theory to inform this discussion by arguing that journalism
is a political institution, and like other institutions, it has certain rules and routines
that dictate how it operates. One rule is that journalists should act as neutral observers,
attempting to balance the arguments on both sides of the debate (Cook, 2005). At the
same time, however, the rules of journalism evolve over time, thus another role that
has emerged with the advent of television news is that journalists are increasingly ex-
pected to act as interpreters of political behaviour (Cater, 1959). It is in their role of in-
terpreter that journalists compete with political elites to present interpretations of
political issues to the public. This role of interpreter has also provoked the largest con-
demnation of the media. Many have argued that television journalism has emphasized
style over substance, with journalists examining the strategies behind policy, rather
than the policies themselves (Fallows, 1997; McKibben, 1993; Patterson, 1994).
While content analyses of policy issues and elections often fail to show overt bias
in favour of one or the other side in a political contest, these same studies note that
journalists frame issues quite apart from how the political actors would like the issue
or event to be discussed. One way journalists evaluate politics is through the strategic
frame of assessing the strategies and motivations of political actors (Berganza, 2009;
Callaghan & Schnell, 2001; Cross, 2010; Hollander, 2006; Jamieson & Cappella, 1998;
Lawrence, 2000; Sampert & Trimble, 2003; Schudson, 1995; Shah, Watts, Domke, &
Fan, 2002). 
Canadian election content analyses have also found that the media view politics
from a strategic frame (Mendelsohn, 1993; Sampert & Trimble, 2003; Soroka & Andrew,
2010; Trimble & Sampert, 2004; Wagenberg, Soderlund, Romanow, & Briggs, 1988;
Wilson, 1980-81). Even when Canadian researchers go beyond election studies, they
tend to find that strategic frames dominate. In a study of newspaper coverage of the
Gomery Commission, the strategic frame was presented in the English press more so
than in the French press (Gingras, Sampert, & Gagnon-Pelletier, 2010). For Gingras
and her associates, “the consequence of the strategic frame being emphasized over
the issue frame makes us believe that … readers were provided with an incomplete vi-
sion and implications of the findings of the [Gomery] Commission” (p. 291). This con-
clusion echoes the concern of Sparrow (1999), who asks, “If the press discusses only
the ‘surface’ of political issues and only ‘samples’ reality, what effect does their super-
ficiality and sampling have on democratic government” (p. 8)?
Apart from condemning the strategic frame, few researchers examine the broader
implication of why this dominant frame is considered so salient. An exception is Regina
Lawrence (2000), who argues that there are particular contexts in which strategic con-
cerns are more important from a journalistic perspective than substantive issues. She
points to situations when a policy is nearing its completion, when there is a high degree
of conflict, and in instances with a clear outcome. In contrast, Callaghan and Schnell
(2001) argue that journalists exert power by interpreting and analyzing the behaviours
and strategies of political actors. “The media have an interdependent yet competitive
relationship with interest groups and elected officials in studying and interpreting po-
litical issues” (p. 184). New institutionalists such as Cook (2005) and Hallin (1992) see
the behaviour of journalists as part of the broader market-based environment where
the media competes with political players to define and mould political discourse. At
the same time, some critical communication scholars argue that in order to maintain
corporate market share, television emphasizes the strategic frame to retain audiences
(Bennett, 1990; Parenti, 1993).
This study poses/addresses three primary research questions: First, did television
news balance the competing frames, as theorized by new institutionalism? Second,
what proportion of the coverage examined substantive claims of the political actors
compared with the strategic frame presented by television news? Finally, what was the
balance of assessments of the political players on television news? While content analy-
sis can only ask what happened, the discussion section will move beyond what the
coverage looked like to probe some possible reasons for the ways in which it unfolded.
Before these matters are dealt with, a few words are needed to set the context for this
unusual event in Canadian politics.
Background to the “crisis”
The Conservative Party of Canada won its second minority government on October
14, 2008. This win represented a 16-seat increase from its previous minority govern-
ment in 2006. The increase in legislative seats for the Conservatives meant that none
of the opposition parties held the balance of power. Defeating the government in a
non-confidence measure would require unanimity among the three political parties
of the Liberals, New Democrats, and Bloc Québécois. The previous Conservative gov-
ernment had the distinction of being the longest uninterrupted minority Parliament
in Canadian history, lasting 937 days (Parliament of Canada, n.d.). That parliament
could have lasted longer, as there was no confidence vote to defeat the government.
Instead, Prime Minister Harper went against the spirit of the fixed-date election amend-
ment when he asked the Governor General to dissolve Parliament a year before the
scheduled October 19, 2009, election date.
It was in this context that, following the election, the Conservative government
appeared to be governing as if it had a majority. During the fall of 2008 there was much
concern about Canada’s ability to weather the global financial crisis. Upon forming
the minority government, Finance Minister James Flaherty presented an economic
and fiscal statement, which “set out the government’s key short-term and long-term
objectives as we prepare for the next federal budget” (Flaherty, 2008). The economic
update had two objectives: to signal that the government would not engage in deficit
financing to create stimulus funding; and to state that the government would attempt
to reduce some spending so that it could provide essential services. Flaherty argued
that the government was providing stimulus to deal with the financial uncertainty in
the form of tax reductions, job-creation infrastructure, and investment in science and
technology. Rather than announce new program spending in the form of a stimulus
to the economy, Flaherty proposed that the government show restraint and respect
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for taxpayer dollars. His most contentious proposal was to eliminate a $1.95 per-vote
subsidy for political parties (Flaherty, 2008).
The reaction by the opposition parties was swift and unified. In addition to their
denunciation of the overall direction of the fiscal restraint, they argued that the gov-
ernment was using the recession as a pretext to unfairly punish all the opposition par-
ties, which relied more on the vote subsidy for their financial well-being than did the
Conservatives. As one Bloc Québécois MP said, “Mr. Speaker, yesterday, this House
witnessed a most disturbing attack on democracy. Most political analysts are roundly
condemning the government’s frontal assault on the law governing political party fi-
nancing. The Prime Minister’s approach is being described as nothing less than irre-
sponsible” (Canada, 2008).
During the weekend after Flaherty’s speech, exchanges between the political par-
ties became more heated: the opposition parties made it clear that they were going to
join forces to defeat the government in a confidence vote over the economic statement.
As a result, the government capitulated on a number of its proposals, also making a
promise to table a stimulus budget by January 27, 2009 (Barton, 2008). Despite these
concessions, the Liberal and NDP leaders signed the historic accord, agreeing that they
would approach the Governor General after defeating the government in a confidence
vote and form a new government. The accord stipulated that the coalition would be
primarily between the Liberals and NDP, whereby each party would have cabinet min-
isters, while the Bloc Québécois agreed to support the coalition as long as it served
the interests of Québec.
Methods
This study analyzes Canadian English television news reports from December 1 to 5,
2008. The coalition partners signed their historic agreement on December 1. The crisis
lasted until December 4, when the Governor General prorogued Parliament. The analy-
sis includes December 5 to incorporate television assessments of the week’s events.
Television is chosen as it remains the main source for news and public affairs in Canada.
Despite the increasing use of the Internet for news retrieval, especially among younger
people (Zamaria & Fletcher, 2008), 91% of frequent news users cite television news as
an important source of information, compared to 30% for the Internet and 70% for
newspapers (Keown, 2007).2
All English national network newscasts were selected: CBC’s The National, CTV
News, and Global National. CTV News and Global National the latter two are traditional
nightly national news programs; CBC’s The National is a hybrid program. The first half
hour of the broadcast is a typical newscast, with news stories and headlines. The sec-
ond half of the broadcast provides panel discussions and more in-depth feature re-
porting, making it more similar to public affairs programming. It should be noted that
this study is about how the coalition was presented to English Canada. Polls conducted
at the time showed the nation was divided between Québec and the rest of Canada.
For example, a poll from December 3, 2008, conducted by the Strategic Counsel for
The Globe and Mail, found that while 55% of Quebeckers supported the coalition re-
placing the Conservative government, outside Québec, 64% opposed the coalition
(Strategic Counsel, 2008). Because of the disparity in support for the coalition between
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English and French Canada, a separate study is needed to examine the coalition frames
in French-language television news.
Unit of analysis and materials
The unit of analysis for the content analysis is the statement. Although the typical unit
of measurement employed in these studies is the story (Choi, 2009; Matthes, 2009;
Mendelsohn, 1993; Trimble & Sampert, 2004; Wagenberg et al., 1988; Wilson, 1980-81),
I agree with Entman (2006) that the “story as a unit of analysis does not allow us to
measure relative dominance and saturation more precisely” (p. 219). The statement
as the unit of analysis increases coder reliability and provides a more valid measure of
television coverage of the crisis.
All stories that covered the proposed coalition government were selected. Televi-
sion transcripts were retrieved from the Virtual News Library and ProQuest by select-
ing all the stories broadcast during the week. Stories pertaining to the coalition were
manually chosen by the author. While some scholars warn against conducting content
analysis of television without also examining the video—lest researchers miss valuable
nuances—in this case I was not looking at the visuals or nuances of facial expressions,
but rather at what substantive and strategic frames and evaluations were presented.
This methodological approach is consistent with the majority of content analyses, as
83% completely neglect visuals (Matthes, 2009). Therefore, reading the transcripts
provides the necessary material to conduct the analysis. It is, however, acknowledged
that some context may be lost by not also examining the visuals.
To obtain the measurement, each frame was treated as a unique nominal variable
that was dichotomously coded as either the government or the coalition frame. The
methodological assumption here is that the government and coalition were de facto
the primary definers and that all other sources would have to first respond to their
frames before providing an alternative perspective. This assumption is borne out by a
reading of the transcripts before the codebook was developed. Because the statement
is the unit of analysis, a sentence can have more than one frame. Each sentence was
coded as to whether it included a particular frame. Then the coder identified whether
the frame represented the government position or the coalition position.3 For example,
on CBC’s December 3 The National, Jack Layton said, “Stephen Harper has broken his
trust with the Canadian people, and because of that he’s lost the confidence of Parlia-
ment” (Boag, 2008). This sentence was coded as having two frames (statements) from
the coalition perspective: the problem definition that he lost Parliament’s confidence;
and the causal analysis that Harper broke the trust of Canadians. In contrast, Craig
Oliver’s statement on CTV on the same day—reporting “The prime minister will ask
the Governor General tomorrow for a cooling-off period”—was identified as a remedy
endorsement frame from the government’s perspective (Oliver, 2008).
This coding technique was also applied to strategic frames and evaluations. Since
each statement was coded, there was a differentiation between substantive and strate-
gic frames. In the case of strategic frames, evaluations were categorized using these
variables: which side was being discussed; and evaluation (unfavourable or
favourable). For example, on the December 5 CTV News, Peter Donolo, the vice-presi-
dent of the Strategic Counsel polling firm, assessed Stéphane Dion by saying, “Mr.
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Dion, whose sales skills were already kind of rejected by Canadians, just weren’t up to
what was going to be a terrific challenge” (Smith, 2008). This was coded as one nega-
tive statement regarding the performance of the Liberals from a strategic frame. Pre-
vious studies have shown that television news tends to focus on negative rather than
positive assessments of political actors (Miljan & Cooper, 2003; Sheafer, 2007). The
source of each statement was also coded. This identification helps capture the extent
to which television news went beyond the primary definers. 
Coder reliability 
In all, 93 stories were collected and coded by three independent coders.4 The sample
consists of 24 CBC’s The National, 21 CTV News, and 16 Global News stories, resulting
in 467 CBC television, 308 CTV News, and 193 Global News coded statements. Coders
were trained in how to determine frames and were given a detailed rule book. Fifteen
percent of the stories were used to conduct intercoder reliability tests. Using Scott’s pi
using pairs, the overall reliability was .91, which is considered acceptable.5
Findings
Framing by television
As can be seen in Table 1, two-thirds of television attention focused on strategic frames
compared with substantive frames. The program most likely to provide strategic
frames was CBC’s The National, with 70.4% of the overall coverage, while Global Na-
tionalwas the least likely to present strategic frame, at 58% of coverage. The difference
in the programs is reflective of the fact that each show has a different format. For
CBC, as was mentioned above, the start of the program provides mostly news stories,
while the second half of the hour often has in-depth reports and panel discussions.
On CTV, while the program is mostly a news format, the anchor will often interview
journalists at the end of their stories to provide greater context and insight. Global,
in contrast, did not provide any panel discussions for its viewers. News anchor Kevin
Newman would ask for a reporter’s analysis at the end of the story; however, these
assessments were very brief. For example, on December 2, Kevin Newman asked
Jacques Bourbeau, Global’s Ottawa Bureau Chief, “Boy, was there a lot of heat in this
House today, but I mean, is there another side of this? Is there a danger in provoking
the separatists? They were elected by a lot of Quebeckers. I mean, is the prime min-
ister maybe stoking a national unity crisis to try to save his skin?” To which Bourbeau
replied:
Well, Kevin, I do think it’s a risky strategy because talking about deals with
separatists, first of all, the prime minister risks fuelling anger in English
Canada, especially Western Canada. He also risks angering Quebeckers who
may be wondering why it’s such a sin to elect Bloc Québécois MPs and have
them take part in a coalition government, but it seems that as Stephen Harper
is fighting for his political life, he is willing to risk unleashing those passions.
(Bourbeau, 2008)
Although the Global assessments were briefer than what was seen on CBC or CTV,
they still provided the reporter an opportunity to provide analysis and commentary
on the day’s events. The difference in coverage between the strategic frame and the
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substantive frames of the actors involved in the crisis is not due to chance, as Chi-
Square is statistically significant at the .01 level.6
Table 1: Frames by television network
Note: χ2 = 10.22633, 2 df p > .01
Framing through television
Despite the relatively small attention paid to competing government and coalition
frames, television news presented those frames in roughly equal proportion. On ag-
gregate, the networks balanced the government and coalition frames. However, when
the networks are examined individually, we find that Global and CBC were more likely
to present the government’s preferred frame (59.3 and 55.1%, respectively) than the
coalition partner’s frame (see Table 2). In contrast, CTV gave more attention to coali-
tion claims, thus providing government frames at 46.5%. However, the differences be-
tween the networks are so small that we cannot rule out chance variation, as the
Chi-Square statistic is not statistically significant.
Table 2: Substantive frames by network
Note: χ2 = 3.186, 2 df n.s.
Television assessments
In addition to examining frames, the analysis also noted the evaluations of government
and coalition actors. Overall, network news gave more unfavourable evaluations of
the government and coalition than they provided favourable evaluations (see Tables
3a and 3b). For evaluations of the government, television news provided 78.8% un-
favourable assessments, with only 21.2% favourable assessments. Global and CBC were
the most critical, with 79.7% and 79.8% unfavourable for the government; CTV was
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CBC CTV Global Total
N % N % N % N %
Substantive frame 138 29.6 101 32.8 81 42.0 320 33.1
Strategic frame 329 70.4 207 67.2 112 58.0 648 66.9
467 100.0 308 100.0 193 100.0 968 100.0
CBC CTV Global Total
N % N % N % N %
Government 76 55.1 47 46.5 48 59.3 171 53.4  
Coalition 62 44.9 54 53.5 33 40.7 149 46.5   
138 100.0 101 100.0 81 100.0 320 100.0
slightly less critical, at 76.9% unfavourable toward the government. The assessments
of the opposition were slightly more unbalanced, with a combined 79.9% unfavourable
to 20.1% favourable assessments. For the coalition, CBC (83.1%) and Global (83.9%)
had the highest proportion of unfavourable comments, at 83%, followed by CTV, at
72.1%. While the networks appear to be proportionately more unfavourable toward
the coalition than the government, this does not take into consideration the total num-
ber of evaluations on network news.
Table 3a: Government evaluations by network
Note: χ2 = .365, 2 df n.s.
Table 3b: Coalition evaluations by network
Note: χ2 = 6.123, 2 df, p > .05
Figure 1 displays the results from Tables 3a and 3b graphically by plotting the amount
of favourable and unfavourable attention by network for both the coalition and the
government. CBC’s coverage appears to have a greater volume of unfavourable assess-
ments toward the coalition than do the other two networks. Examining all the evalu-
ative statements, we can see that while CBC had equal coverage of favourable
commentary regarding the government and the coalition (9.2% each), The National
spent more time evaluating critically the coalition than it did the government (45.3%
coalition compared with 36.3% government). Many of the unfavourable assessments
singled out Dion. In part, this had to do with real concerns regarding his ability to lead
a coalition government when he had already announced his resignation as the Liberal
leader after the autumn election. This was the point raised by Rex Murphy (2008) in
his December 1 commentary on The National: “The latest bulletin has Stéphane Dion
installed as prime minister, a man who after the 77 seats he brought home in the elec-
tion, the Liberals couldn’t wait to boot out of their leadership.”
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CBC CTV Global Total
N % N % N % N %
Favourable 34 20.2 25 23.1 12 20.3 71 21.2
Unfavourable 134 79.8 83 76.9 47 79.7 264 78.8
168 100.0 108 100.0 59 100.0 335 100.0
CBC CTV Global Total
N % N % N % N %
Favourable 34 16.9 31 27.9 10 16.1 75 20.1
Unfavourable 167 83.1 80 72.1 52 83.9 299 79.9
201 100.0 111 100.0 62 100.0 374 100.0
In contrast, CTV provided slightly more unfavourable assessments of the govern-
ment than the coalition (37.9% government compared with 36.5% coalition). For
Global, the proportion was reversed, with the coalition receiving 43% unfavourable as-
sessments compared with the government’s 38.8%. Moreover, the government also re-
ceived more favourable assessments on Global than did the coalition, at 9.9%
compared with 8.3%.
Figure 1: Evaluations by network 
Sources
To explain the coverage observed on these three networks the study also looked at
the sources of the coded statements. As can be seen in Table 4, journalists made the
highest proportion of statements. All three networks feature journalists more often
than any other source. CBC had the least, with 62.5% of their sources, followed by
Global with 63.9% and CTV with 67% of the sources. In terms of primary definers, we
see that coalition representatives outnumbered the government. Overall, coalition rep-
resentatives made 11.7% of the statements compared with the government at 8.5%. No
doubt this had to do with the fact that there were two coalition partners, plus the Bloc
Québécois. While the coalition partners may have had more airtime, it does not nec-
essarily mean that they were able to present a clear and unified message. Over the
course of the week, the various partners at times were just as critical of each other as
they were of the government. Added to the primary definers were institutional sources
such as pollsters (2.2%), pundits (1.6%), and academics (3.1%). The inclusion of such
sources is consistent with the literature on primary definers, which indicates that in-
stitutional actors often provide legitimacy to the positions made by the primary defin-
ers. There was some inclusion of the public. In this case, CBC stood out by providing
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the public with the most coverage, at 10.6% of the total source statements, followed
by CTV with 8.7% and Global with 3.8%.
Table 4: Sources
Note: χ2 = 78.433, 2  p>.000
Discussion and conclusion
This article answered three questions regarding Canadian English network television’s
news coverage of the 2008 Liberal/NDP Accord. New institutionalism theory posits
that in a two-sided contest, the news will balance competing frames. The analysis
found that television news presented both the preferred frames of the government
and the coalition, in roughly similar proportions. However, CBC and Global gave more
attention to the government than the coalition, while CTV News gave more attention
to the coalition’s frame. Although there were differences in the treatment the two sides
received, the differences were relatively small, to the extent that no one side completely
dominated the debate. There was diversity in the sponsor frames, with a balance of
coverage between the two sides of the conflict. In addition, the study found that there
was substantial similarity among broadcasters in the sense that each was careful to
provide both sides of the dispute in relative proportion.
The second research question asked about the proportion of coverage that would
be devoted to the substantive frames compared to strategy. New institutionalism the-
ory argues that because of the increasing interpretive function of journalists (Cater,
1959), television news tends to focus on strategy over substance. The findings in this
study are consistent with much of the research on Canadian news, in that the strategic
or game frame was emphasized. However, because of the nature of the crisis, strategy
was a key component of the unfolding events. The very nature of a coalition govern-
ment was rife with uncertainty about how it would develop and what the Conservative
government could do to avoid the inevitable. Television news used strategy and per-
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CBC CTV Global Total
N % N % N % N %
Journalist 596 62.5 362 67.0 202 63.9 1160 64.1
Government 74 7.8 36 6.7 44 13.9 154 8.5
Coalition 113 11.8 54 10.0 45 14.2 212 11.7
Academic 35 3.7 9 1.7 12 3.8 56 3.1
Public 101 10.6 47 8.7 12 3.8 160 8.8
Pollster 20 2.1 19 3.5 0 0.0 39 2.2
Pundit 15 1.6 13 2.4 1 0.3 29 1.6
Total 954 100.0 540 100.0 316 100.0 1810 100.0
formance of the leaders as the primary topic for their interpretative function. Leaving
the debate of the merits of the proposed coalition or the prorogation of Parliament to
the frame sponsors, they instead focused much more of their commentary on the fol-
lowing: how the parties performed; speculation on the next moves of the government
or coalition partners; and, the potential problems of the coalition being led by
Stéphane Dion. As we learned from Lawrence (2000), strategic concerns are particu-
larly associated with a high degree of conflict. The proposed coalition was a unique
and unprecedented political conflict that fit especially well into this journalistic frame.
It is beyond the scope of this article to compare directly public opinion with tel-
evision coverage. However, media-sponsored public opinion polls indicating the pub-
lic thought Dion should resign are consistent with television assessments of him. For
example, an Ekos poll showed that 60% of Canadians thought Dion should resign.
The same poll also found that of committed Liberal voters, 53% agreed that Dion
should resign before the new year, with only 36% disagreeing with the statement. The
same could not be said of Harper, as only 8% of Conservative voters polled thought
the prime minister should resign (Graves & Adams, 2008b).7 Much of the criticism
of Dion’s performance had to do with the television addresses made by Harper and
Dion on December 3. In this context, discussion of strategy was highly salient for tel-
evision news in assessing the ability for the coalition to sell its idea. In the prominent
“At Issue” panel on The National, Peter Mansbridge (2008) started his line of ques-
tioning with the following observation: “Stéphane Dion didn’t look like the prime
minister under a Christmas tree. He kind of looked like he was on YouTube. It was a
very odd presentation, and I’m wondering how much of it took away from the case
he was trying to make or whether he made that case.” Robert Fife (2008) in his CTV
News story reported that the coalition partners were also concerned about the per-
formance, saying, “Well, Mr. Dion’s coalition partners are also livid, the NDP saying
this fiasco tonight undermined the credibility of the coalition. How can they show
that they can govern the country if they can’t deliver a tape on time, and a tape that
looked like it was filmed with a cellphone?” While this study did not examine French-
language media, polls at the time showed that while Quebeckers may have been more
likely to support the coalition than the rest of Canada, they nonetheless also gave
Dion poor marks. An Angus Reid poll found 60% of Quebeckers disagreed with the
statement, “I would be comfortable with Stéphane Dion becoming Canada’s Prime
Minister” (Reid, 2008).
In addition to criticism of Dion, serious concerns were raised by pundits and jour-
nalists about the coalition when Bloc Québécois leader Gilles Duceppe indicated that
he signed the accord because the deal was good for the separatist cause.8 This resulted
not only in the government accusing the Liberals of being in league with “socialists
and separatists” but also prompted a backlash against the coalition, especially in West-
ern Canada. At the same time, this line of attack may have played well with Western
Canadians; it was where the Conservative government was given a significant volume
of criticism from pundits and the coalition partners. Journalists presented the case
that the prime minister was being reckless in his strategy to maintain political power.
For example, consider this passage from Genevieve Beauchemin’s story for CTV News
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on December 4, 2008 within clips of Harper saying “Separatists” were interjected into
the story:
Genevieve Beauchemin (Reporter): Lloyd, the war of words in Ottawa has hit
hard in Quebec, landing straight in the middle of a provincial election cam-
paign. In La Belle Province, that’s the name of this diner, some say the Con-
servatives are serving up trouble for Canadian unity. 
Unidentified woman: Making us feel like we’re nothing. 
Beauchemin: Harper’s attacks on the coalition focused on its alliance with the
Bloc Québécois.
Stephen Harper (Canadian Prime Minister): Separatist party.
Harper: The separatists.
Harper: With the separatists.
Beauchemin: To some, that may end up fanning the flames of sovereignty, an
issue that had been on the back burner.
Antonia Maioni (McGill University): And now it seems that we’re back into a
very much a politics of division. 
Beauchemin: Quebeckers have had little interest in the provincial election
campaign. But it seems Jean Charest’s Liberals were heading for a majority.
Now it may be a new game, predict some analysts.
Luc Lavoie (Former Brian Mulroney Advisor): The Québec bashing that came
out of this political collaboration led by the Conservative government in Ot-
tawa was not very helpful to the federalist cause in Québec. It was not very
helpful to the federalist party in Québec.
Beauchemin: Even Harper’s use of the word separatist, even though he uses
souvrenist, or sovereignist in French, has many saying Harper is pushing the
buttons of division. Separatist is a loaded term, in the province.
While Beauchemin does provide an endorsement from one person on the street in an
interview for the Conservative strategy, the majority of the story focuses on the poten-
tial problems of Québec separatism. These findings underline the difficulty for political
elites to have the media accept their framing of events and issues. It is one thing to at-
tempt to demonize or create a “folk devil” of one’s opponents and quite another to
have the media accept such a characterization without comment or criticism. In con-
trast to the literature on moral panics, we find, in this instance at least, that television
news presented independent perspectives outside of government and the opposition
party to oppose the characterization of the coalition being in the hands of “separatists.”
Analyzing how this theme played out in the Québec media would be instructive to
help decipher public opinion at the time, but and also might give insight into the seeds
of the electoral tsunami that changed the face of Québec politics in the 2011 federal
election campaign, when the Bloc Québécois was reduced to four seats and the NDP
became the most successful federalist party in decades.
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This article adds to our understanding of the role of television as an institution in
Canadian political life. With the guidance of new institutional theory, we can see how
English television news balanced, for the most part, the competing frames in a conflict
but also how it assessed the parties and leaders. The fact that CBC provided both the
most analysis and the largest volume of critical attention to the coalition is a rather in-
teresting development. Conservative commentators have frequently complained of
CBC’s so-called left-wing bias (Levant, 2011). Stephen Harper has been openly hostile
to the Crown corporation and has had a tumultuous relationship with the CBC, often
complaining of a bias against him and his party (Morrison, 2011). Yet, in this instance
at least, CBC, while not overwhelmingly unfavourable to the Conservatives, was at
least more critical of their opponents than of them. Whether this has to do with the
events of the week, a change in editorial direction, or a misrepresentation of CBC’s
coverage in the past is beyond the scope of this article to address.
Not only did television have a role to play in how the political parties presented
their case to the Canadian public, but also television’s selection of strategic frames may
have influenced the standards by which the parties were assessed by the public. The
third research question was to what extent television news would balance the public’s
assessments of the political players. It is on this question we see the importance of the
interpretive function of English network TV news. The emphasis by television news
on Dion’s leadership status, concern about the role of the Bloc Québécois, and the lack
of Canadian precedents in coalition governments helped legitimize to English Canada
Harper’s unprecedented solution to prorogue parliament. Nonetheless, television news
media also focused much of their own assessments questioning the strategy and per-
formance of the government in trying to maintain power. In the final analysis, English
network television news did present dissenting views on both the actions of the gov-
ernment and those of the coalition.
Having addressed the question of how television news covered the events of the
first week of December, we can speculate on why television news covered the crisis as
it did. The literature on political crisis may help provide the answers. In the case of the
proposed coalition, there were two primary definers who were opposed to each other:
the Conservative government and the coalition partners. The relatively short period
of time made it virtually impossible for any other interpretive frames by which to view
the events. Over a very long period of time, the primary interpretative framework may
be altered, however, it “is extremely difficult to alter fundamentally, once established”
(Hall et al., 1978, p. 59). Therefore, it is not surprising that once the coalition had been
stopped, albeit by prorogation and not popular opinion, Stephen Harper and the Con-
servatives used the potential of a new coalition in his 2011 campaign rhetoric. Moving
away from the terms “socialists and separatists,” Harper instead used the mantra “reck-
less coalition” and “strong, stable, national, majority Conservative government” to un-
derline his theme. Despite journalists’ cries that that the theme was repetitive, it was
one that Harper continued to use up to and beyond the May 2, 2011, election
campaign.9
Even though journalists did not accept the Conservative government’s character-
izations of its opponents, the “reckless coalition” was a theme that the party continued
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to use in the years following the crisis. This study should give us pause as to how much
power journalists yield when it comes to their criticism of politicians and events. In
addition to examining French-language television coverage of the events, further re-
search is needed to see whether television news exhibits the same coverage of other
crises as well as on policy issues. Additional studies are also needed to compare televi-
sion with traditional media such as newspapers and radio. As the Internet becomes a
more dominant form of news dissemination, how the public interacts with media in-
terpretations will also be valuable in assessing the power of the media. While new in-
stitutionalism holds that journalists are powerful players in their coverage and
assessment of political actors, those political actors wield independent strength that
can overcome negative media attention.
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Notes
1. All of the major news media referred at some point to the events of the first week of December 2008
as a political crisis. For example, CBC News offered a webpage that provided a collection of stories on
the event, labelling the page “Coalition Crisis” (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/12/01
/f-coalition.html). Headlines in daily newspapers across the country also emphasized the crisis label
(see, for example, Beauchesne, 2008; Diebel, 2008; Greenaway, 2008; Guttormson, 2008; Linke, 2008;
Marsden, 2008). In addition, the events prompted the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Law to host a
forum entitled “Crisis in Canada: Coalition Government and Beyond,” with a number of constitutional
experts.
2. Much anecdotal information suggests that Canadians did use the Internet to mobilize support for
rallies and to debate the issue. I do not wish to suggest that the Internet did not have a role to play in
the events that occurred during the week of the crisis, only that separate study is needed to investigate
that role.
3. The detailed coding rule book is available from the author by request.
4. The author would like to thank students Daniel Hobson, Daryl Ann Sdao, and Rhulangane Mung-
wete for their tireless work in coding the stories.
5. Individual coefficients calculated with Scott’s pi were as follows: sources = .97; problem definition=.87;
causal = .88; remedy endorsement = .90; side being discussed = .95; assessments = .95; and spin = .90.
6. While the study employs a census sample in which no statistical measures are necessary, the Chi-
Square statistic is used to measure whether the differences we see are real or could be attributed to
chance variation.
7. The poll results are based on the following polls and questions: The Angus Reid results are based a
random online survey of 1,102 Canadian adults administered between December 1 and 2, 2008, “As
you may know, the Conservative minority government faces a confidence motion on December 8,
which states: ‘This house has lost confidence in this government and is of the opinion that a viable al-
ternative government can be formed within the present House of Commons.’ How would you like
your own Member of Parliament to vote on this measure?” (Reid, 2008). The Ekos results are based
on an interactive voice recognition random survey of 2,536 Canadians from December 2 to 3 that asked,
“The Conservative government of Stephen Harper will likely be defeated when Parliament next has
an opportunity to vote. The opposition parties want to replace the Conservatives with a coalition made
up of Liberals and New Democrats led on an interim basis by Stéphane Dion. Based on this, which of
the following is closest to your own view? Parliament taking a break for a month or so to see whether
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the Conservatives can get the confidence of parliament when it comes back into session. The proposed
coalition of Liberals and New Democrats replacing the Conservative government within the next few
weeks. An election to be called within the news few weeks to break the impasse” (Graves & Adams,
2008a). The Strategic Counsel poll is based on a national telephone survey of 1,000 Canadians Decem-
ber 3, 2008, that asked, “Do you support or oppose the Liberal-NDP coalition replacing the Conservative
Government?” (Strategic Counsel, 2008). Results are based on net support and net opposed responses.
8. On December 2, 2009, Gilles Duceppe was quoted in a story by Susan Bonner (2008) in which he
said, “I think every gain we’re making here is good for Québec, and what’s good for Québec is good
for a sovereign Québec.”
9. In a separate paper, I will be examining television news coverage of the 2011 election campaign.
Transcripts reveal that Harper used the phrase “reckless coalition” throughout the campaign. On elec-
tion night he repeated the theme, indicating that Canadians had voted for a “strong, stable, national,
majority Conservative government.”
References
Aday, Sean. (2006). The framesetting effects of news: An experiment test of advocacy versus objec-
tivist frames. Journalism and Mass Communications Quarterly, 83(4), 767-784.
Barton, Rosemary (Journalist). (2008, November 30). Threats, backtracking and secretly taped phone
calls. Sunday Night. Toronto, ON: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Beauchemin, Genevieve (Journalist). (2008, December 4). Sovereignty. CTV News. Toronto, ON:
CTVglobemedia.
Beauchesne, Eric. (2008, December 2). Ottawa crisis spooks Bay St. Leader Post, p. D1.
Bennett, Lance. (1990). Toward a theory of press state relations in the United States. Journal of Com-
munication, 40(2), 103-125.
Bennett, Lance, & Lawrence, Regina. (2007). When the press fails: Political power and the news media
from Iraq to Katrina. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Berganza, Rosa. (2009). Framing the European union and building the media agenda: The 2004 Eu-
ropean parliamentary elections in the Spanish daily press. Journal of Political Marketing, 8,
59-69. 
Boag, Keith (Reporter). (2008, December 3). Political showdown. The National. Toronto, ON: 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Boin, Arjen, Hart, Paul ’t, & McConnell, Allan. (2009). Crisis exploitation: Political and policy impacts
of framing contents. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(1), 81-106.
Bonner, Susan (Reporter). (2008, December 2). Gloves off. The National. Toronto, ON: Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation.
Bourbeau, Jacques (Reporter). (2008, December 2). Prime Ministers, Governor General Canada.
Global National. Ottawa, ON: Canwest Global Communications Corporation.
Callaghan, Karen, & Schnell, Frauke. (2001). Assessing the democratic debate: How the news media
frame elite policy discourse. Political Communication, 18, 183-212.
Canada. Parliament. (2008, November 28). House of Commons. Debates [Daily edition], 40th Parl.,
1st sess. URL: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E
&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=1&DocId=3621526&File=0 [May 5, 2010].
Cater, Douglass. (1959). The fourth branch of government. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
CBC. (2001). Journalistic policy. URL: http://www.cbc.radio-canada.ca/docs/policies/journalistic
/xml/policies.asp [August 3, 2011].
CBC News. (2008). Coalition crisis. URL: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/12/01/f-coalition
.html [August 3, 2011].
Choi, Jihyang. (2009). Diversity in foreign news in us newspapers before and after the invasion of
Iraq. International Communication Gazette, 71(6), 525-542.
Chong, Dennis, & Druckman, James. (2007). A theory of framing and opinion formation in compet-
itive elite environments. Journal of Communication, 57, 99-118. 
Miljan Television Frames of Liberal/New Democrat Accord 575
Cohen, Stanley. (1980). Folk devils and moral panics: The creation of mods and rockers (2nd ed.).New
York, NY: St Martin’s Press.
Cook, Timothy. (2005). Governing the news: The news media as a political institution (2nd ed.).
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cook, Timothy. (2006). The news media as a political institution: Looking backward and looking
forward. Political Communication, 23, 159-171. 
Cross, Kathleen Ann. (2010). Experts in the news: The differential use of sources in election television
news. Canadian Journal of Communication, 35(3), 413-429.
Diebel, Linda. (2008, December 8). Ottawa crisis a boon for premier; Polls show majority possible
for Charest. The Toronto Star, p. A12.
Dion, Stéphane, & Layton, Jack. (2008, December 1). An accord on a cooperative government to ad-
dress the present economic crisis. URL: http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/v5/content
/pdf/1201policy.pdf.
Edwards, Susan, & Soetenhorst-de Savornin, Jacqueline. (1994). The impact of ‘moral panic’ on pro-
fessional behavior in cases of child sexual abuse: An international perspective. Journal of
Child Sexual Abuse, 3(1), 103-126.
Edy, Jill, A., & Meirick, Patrick C. (2007). Wanted, dead or alive: Media frames, frame adoption, and
support for the war in Afghanistan. Journal of Communication, 57, 119-141.
Entman, Robert, M. (2004). Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Entman, Robert. (2006). Punctuating the homogeneity of institutionalized news: Abusing prisoners
at Abu Ghraib versus killing civilians at Fallujah. Political Communication, 23(2), 215-224.
Entman, Robert. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. Journal of Communication,
57, 163-173.
Fallows, James. (1997). Breaking the news: How the media undermine American democracy. New York,
NY: Vintage Books.
Fife, Robert (Journalist). (2008, December 3). Coalition government. CTV News. Toronto, ON: CTV-
globemedia.
Flaherty, James. (2008, November 27). The economic and fiscal statement 2008 [Speech]. URL:
http://www.fin.gc.ca/ec2008/Speech/speech-eng.html [April 12, 2010].
Frizzell, Alan, & Westell, Anthony. (1985). The Canadian general election of 1984: Politicians, parties,
press and polls. Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press.
Gingras, Anne-Marie, Sampert, Shannon, & Gagnon-Pelletier, Dave. (2010). Framing Gomery in English
and French newspapers: The use of strategic and ethical frames. In Shannon Sampert & Linda
Trimble (Eds.), Mediating Canadian politics (pp. 277-293). Toronto, ON: Pearson.
Graves, Frank, & Adams, Paul. (2008a, December 4). Results of a CBC news survey. Ekos.
Graves, Frank, & Adams, Paul. (2008b, December 5). Poll results: A deeply divided public ponders pro-
rogation. Ekos.
Greenaway, Norma. (2008, December 5). Political crisis spooks public; ‘Truly scared’ voters prefer
new election to coalition: poll. The Edmonton Journal, p. A1.
Gross, Kimberley, & D’Ambrosio, Lisa. (2004). Framing emotional response. Political Psychology,
25(1)1-29.
Guttormson, Kim. (2008, December 2). Coalition talk prompts anger, disbelief; Calgarians divided
on political crisis. Calgary Herald, p. A5.
Hall, Stuart, Critcher, Chas, Jefferson, Tony, Clarke, John, & Roberts, Brian. (1978). Policing the crisis:
Mugging, the state, and law and order. New York, NY: Holmes & Meier Publishers.
Hallin, D. C. (1992). Sound bite news: Television coverage of elections, 1968-1988. Journal of Commu-
nication, 42(2), 5-24.
Hollander, Robyn. (2006). Elections, policy and the media: Tasmania’s forests and the 2004 federal
election. Australian Journal of Political Science, 41, 569-584. 
Homan, Shane. (2003). The tabloid, the dance party and the premier: The policy legacy of Anna
Wood. Media International Australia incorporating Culture & Policy, 108, 36-49. 
576 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 36 (4)
Hunt, Arnold. (1997). ‘Moral Panic’ and Moral Language in the Media. The British Journal of Sociology,
48(4), 629-648. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591600 [July 11, 2011].
Iyengar, Shanto, & Simon, Adam. (1993). News coverage of the Gulf crisis and public opinion: A sur-
vey of effects. Communication Research, 20(3), 365-383.
Jamieson, Kathleen, & Cappella, Joseph. (1998). The role of the press in the health care reform debate
of 1993-1994. In Doris Graber, Denis McQuail, & Pippa Norris (Eds.), The politics of news, the
news of politics (pp. 110-131). Washington DC: CQ Press.
Johansen, Morgen, & Joslyn, Mark R. (2008). Political persuasion during times of crisis: The effects
of education and news media on citizens’ factual information about Iraq. Journalism and
Mass Communications Quarterly, 85(3), 591-608.
Johnston, Richard, Blais, André, Brady, Henry, & Crête, Jean. (1992). Letting the people decide: 
Dynamics of a Canadian election. Montréal, QC: McGill University Press.
Jones, Kate. (2008). Professional politicians as the subjects of moral panic. Australian Journal of 
Political Science, 43(2), 243-258.
Keown, Leslie-Anne. (2007). Keeping up with the times: Canadians and their news media diet. 
Canadian Social Trends. Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 11-008.
Klug, Francesca. (2005). Human rights: Above politics or a creature of politics? Policy and Politics,
33(1), 3-14.
Lawrence, Regina. (2000). Game-framing the issues: Tracking the strategy frame in public policy
news. Political Communication, 17, 93-114.
Lawrence, Regina. (2006). Seeing the whole board: New institutional analysis of news content. Po-
litical Communication, 23, 225-30.
Levant, Ezra. (2011, April 1). CBC: Bias and secrecy. The Toronto Sun. URL: http://www.torontosun
.com/comment/columnists/ezra_levant/2011/04/01/17832526.html [August 4, 2011].
Linke, Rob. (2008, December 3). Hearts and minds; Crisis Conservatives, Liberal-NDP coalition begin
campaigns to sway public opinion. Telegraph Journal, p. A1.
Mansbridge, Peter (Host). (2008, December 3). Political showdown. The National. Toronto, ON: 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Marsden, William. (2008, December 7). Cold weather, cold words; Rallies held across country put
pros and cons of Ottawa crisis. The Gazette, p. A6.
Matthes, Jörg. (2009). What’s in a frame? A content analysis of media framing studies in the world’s
leading communication journals, 1990-2005. Journalism and Mass Communications Quar-
terly, 86(2), 349-367.
McKibben, Bill. (1993). The age of missing information. New York, NY: Plume.
Mendelsohn, Matthew. (1993). Television news frames in the 1993 Canadian election. Canadian Journal
of Communication, 18, 149-171.
Miljan, Lydia, & Cooper, Barry. (2003). Hidden agendas: How journalists influence the news. Vancouver,
BC: UBC Press.
Morrison, Ian. (2011, May 30). The Conservatives’ hidden agenda for public broadcasting and cultural
sovereignty. Friends of Canadian Broadcasting. URL: http://www.friends.ca/fact-sheet/252
[August 4, 2011].
Murphy, Rex (Commentator). (2008, December 1). Power struggle. The National. Toronto, ON: 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
Nevitte, Neil, Blais, André, Gidengil, Elisabeth, & Nadeau, Richard. (2000). Unsteady state: The 1997
Canadian federal election. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Oliver, Craig (Reporter). (2008, December 3). CTV News. Toronto, ON: CTVglobemedia.
Parenti, Michael. (1993). Inventing reality: The politics of news media, (2nd ed.). New York, NY: St
Martin’s Press.
Parliament of Canada. (n.d.) Federal election trivia. When was the longest minority government? URL:
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/Compilations/ElectionsAndRidings/TriviaMajorityMinority
.aspx#7 [April 12, 2010].
Patterson, Thomas. (1994). Out of order: An incisive and boldly original critique of the news media’s
domination of America’s political process. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Miljan Television Frames of Liberal/New Democrat Accord 577
Price, Vincent, Tewksbury, David, & Powers, Elizabeth. (1997). Switching trains of thought: The impact
of news frames on readers’ cognitive responses. Communication Research, 24(5), 481-506.
Reid, Angus. (2008, December 2). Canadians divided on toppling the Conservative government. Angus
Reid Strategies.
Sampert, Shannon, & Trimble, Linda. (2003). ‘Wham, bam, no thank you Ma’am’: Gender and the
game frame in national newspaper coverage of election 2000. In Manon Tremblay & Linda
Trimble (Eds.), Women and electoral politics in Canada. Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press.
Schudson, Michael. (1995). How the news becomes news. Forbes Media Critic, 2(4), 76-85.
Shah, Dhavan, Watts, Mark, Domke, David, & Fan, David. (2002). News framing and cueing of issue
regimes: Explaining Clinton’s public approval in spite of scandal. Public Opinion Quarterly,
66, 339-380.
Sheafer, Tamir. (2007). How to evaluate it: The role of story-evaluative tone in agenda setting and
priming. Journal of Communication, 57, 21-39.
Smith, Roger (Reporter). (2008, December 5). CTV News, CTV News. Toronto, ON: CTVglobemedia.
Soroka, Stuart, & Andrew, Blake. (2010). Media coverage of Canadian elections: Horse-race coverage
and negativity in election campaigns. In Shannon Sampert & Linda Trimble (Eds.), Medi-
ating Canadian politics (pp. 113-128). Toronto, ON: Pearson.
Sparrow, Bartholomew. (1999). Uncertain guardians: The news media as a political institution. Balti-
more, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Strategic Counsel. (2008, December 4). Harper’s Conservatives versus Liberal-NDP coalition: What
is the state of Canadian public opinion? Strategic Counsel report to The Globe and Mail.
Trimble, Linda, & Sampert, Shannon. (2004). Who’s in the game? The framing of the Canadian elec-
tion 2000 by The Globe and Mail and the National Post. Canadian Journal of Political Science,
37(1), 51-71.
Wagenberg, R. H., Soderlund, W. C., Romanow, W. I., & Briggs, E. D. (1988). Campaigns, images and
polls: Mass media coverage of the 1984 Canadian election. Canadian Journal of Political Sci-
ence, 21, 117-129.
Welch, Michael, Fenwick, Melissa, & Roberts, Meredith. (1997). Primary definitions of crime and
moral panic: A content analysis of experts’ quotes in feature newspaper articles on crime.
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 34(4), 474-494.
Wilson, R. Jeremy. (1980-1981). Media coverage of Canadian election campaigns: Horse-race journal-
ism and the meta-campaign. Journal of Canadian Studies, 15, 56-69.
Zamaria, Charles, & Fletcher, Fred. (2008). Canada online! The Internet, media and emerging tech-
nologies: Uses, attitudes, trends and international comparisons 2007. Toronto, ON: Canadian
Internet Project.
578 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 36 (4)
